-- 2008 Forecast
The following forecasts were included in commentaries posted between the 6th and 17th of January, 2008.
Yearly
Forecast
Random speculations about the year ahead
*The US stock market's
upside will be limited by falling corporate profits (and profit
margins), continued pressure on the financial sector, political
uncertainty, inflation fears, and a lack of growth in consumer spending.
*The stock market's downside will be mitigated by the beating
already dished out to housing-related and financial stocks, as well as
by the fact that the investing public is already very pessimistic.
*The upward trend in the US yield-spread that began in 2007 will
persist through 2008, due initially to long-term interest rates falling
less than short-term rates and then, later in the year, to long-term
interest rates rising faster than short-term interest rates. This will
create a generally positive environment for gold, although gold's bull
market will be interrupted by a substantial 2-4 month correction that
begins during the first two months of the year.
*Gold's H1-2008 correction will be driven by a strong US$ rally
as currency speculators belatedly come to the realisation that the
dollar's large purchasing-power discount to the euro is unwarranted.
*In a desperate effort to revive the economy and the electoral
chances of the Republican Party, the US Federal Government will become
the primary engine of debt/money expansion (inflation) during 2008. As
a result, the people who doubt the ability of the powers-that-be to
maintain a high level of monetary expansion in the face of a 'tapped
out' consumer will receive an "Inflation 101" course. They will learn
that there is no limit to the amount of bonds that the US government
can issue to the Fed in exchange for newly-created currency.
Note: The "pushing on a string" analogy often cited in discussions
about the inflationary abilities of governments and central banks is
based on the patently false assumption that every increase in money
supply will be met by an equivalent increase in money demand with no
change in the price (purchasing power) of money. This assumption goes
against basic economic law. Until the law of supply and demand is
repealed there will be no question that an entity with the power to
expand the supply of money ad infinitum will also have the power to
reduce the purchasing power of the money (bring about a general
increase in prices, that is). The challenge facing the monetary
authorities isn't to maintain a high level of inflation; it's to do so
whilst keeping inflation FEARS in check.
*Weakness in the economy will result in a deflation scare during
the first half of 2008 (a "deflation scare" involves widespread fear
that deflation is a threat, as opposed to something resembling actual
deflation), but the nature of the current monetary system and political
environment will ensure that the weaker the economy the greater the
INFLATION.
The US Dollar
In the 11th January edition
of his "Thoughts From The Frontline" letter, John Mauldin makes the
point that forcing China to upwardly re-value its currency cannot
possibly make a significant dent in the US trade imbalance. The reason
is that the large US trade deficit has been caused by the combination
of increased US consumer spending and reduced US saving, not by the
incorrect pricing of currencies in the foreign exchange market. As he
puts it:
"Want to see the real
problem at the root cause of the trade deficit? The one that candidates
absolutely cannot mention from the debate podiums? Look at the next
chart:
No,
the simple answer is that the trade deficit is not going to come down
until the US starts to save more and spend less. In 1992, consumer
spending was a little over 65% of GDP. It is now closer to 72%. Savings
are down from 8% in that time, to barely above zero. If US consumers
simply saved 5%, as we did 10 years ago, the trade deficit would come
down by a lot."
Unfortunately, Mr. Mauldin stops short of identifying the "real problem
at the root cause of the trade deficit". To identify the real problem
you have to go a step further and ask the question: Why has there been
a long-term trend towards more spending and less saving? After all, the
average American didn't set out, in 1992, with the goal of whittling
down his/her savings to zero over the ensuing 15 years. The reduction
in savings has, instead, been a RATIONAL response to the economic
stimuli of the times.
All you have to do is dig a small distance beneath the surface to
discover that the reduction in the savings rate has been a natural
reaction to inflation. The crux of the matter is that it makes no sense
to keep much of one's wealth in the form of monetary savings if one is
very confident that money will be worth a lot less in the future than
it is today.
As we've explained in many previous commentaries, a trade deficit is
not, in and of itself, a problem. It can, however, be a symptom of an
inflation problem. In the US case, the large slide in the savings rate
that has occurred alongside the large increase in the trade deficit
strongly suggests that the trade deficit is, indeed, symptomatic of
such a problem.
An inflation problem caused the bear market in the Dollar Index, but
the bear market might either be over or about to go into hibernation
for an extended period. This is not because the US no longer has an
inflation problem; it's because the market has taken the US$ too low
relative to other currencies, most notably the euro, that have major
problems of their own. The euro now trades at a 20-30% purchasing-power
premium to the US$, and yet: a) the euro-zone has developed its own
inflation problem thanks to double-digit growth in money supply, b) the
unfunded government liabilities of countries such as Germany and France
are every bit as problematical as those of the US, and c) there is a
significant risk that the European Monetary Union (EMU) will start
coming apart at the seams due to economic distress in countries such as
Italy and Spain.
Which brings us to our 2008 outlook for the Dollar Index:
Our view is that the Dollar Index commenced a bottoming process last
November -- a process that will probably entail at least one test of
the November low and be complete by March of this year. We expect that
an intermediate-term US$ rally, driven initially by the realisation
that the ECB will have to cut interest rates almost as much as the Fed,
will then begin.
Bonds
Preamble
Conventional wisdom has it that slower economic growth will reduce
inflationary pressures, thus creating a bullish environment for
Treasury Bonds. But slower economic growth means a slowdown in the rate
at which 'stuff' is being produced, so if all else remains the same
then slower economic growth will lead to less 'stuff' being chased by
more money. That is, it will INCREASE inflationary pressures, thus
creating a BEARISH environment for T-Bonds.
It could be argued that as the economy slows, the rate at which new
money gets borrowed into existence will fall faster than the rate at
which 'stuff' is being produced. And if so then inflationary pressures
will decline.
The above argument will sometimes be true, but under the current
monetary system it will more often than not prove to be false due to
counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal measures. To be more specific, the
way things typically work these days is that the central bank and the
government take steps to counter the reduction in private-sector
borrowing that occurs in response to an economic downturn. For its
part, the central bank reduces short-term borrowing costs, injects
money into the banking system, and, if necessary, monetises government
debt. The government possibly plays an even greater role in that it
attempts to replace private-sector borrowing and spending with its own
borrowing and spending. And since there is no rigid limit to the amount
of its own currency that a government can borrow it will always be
possible for a government to more than offset any reduction in private
sector borrowing and spending, if that's what it chooses to do. Of
course, the government's spending will be far less productive than the
private sector spending it replaces, but that's not an issue if the
overriding goal is to create the illusion of prosperity in the
present.
Further to the above discussion it should not be surprising that the
most severe recession in the US over the past 50 years -- the 1973-1975
recession -- occurred in parallel with the quickest rise in the general
price level. This was the inevitable outcome when a
Fed/government-generated monetary tidal wave came up against slowed
production of goods and services.
Outlook for T-Bonds
Treasury Bonds are currently benefiting from the general shift away
from higher-risk bonds and from the belief that a weakening US economy
will bring about reduced inflationary pressures. For the reason
discussed above, we think this belief is mistaken. Based on the
historical record and, in particular, on the record of the current US
administration there is a very high probability that economic weakness
over the coming months will prompt a massive increase in US Government
spending, which will, in turn, be monetised by the Fed and thus lead to
greater inflationary pressures. A weaker economy should therefore make
the outlook for government bonds more bearish, although US government
bonds should continue to fare better than higher-risk bonds.
Having said that, there could well be at least 3-6 months between when
the government begins to cobble together an "economic stimulus package"
and when the bond market begins to discount the inflationary effects of
the package. During this period the T-Bond price will probably maintain
an upward bias. This leads to the following bond market outlook for
2008:
The bond market is likely to show modest strength during the first half
of the year. Specifically and with reference to the following weekly
chart, there is a reasonable chance that T-Bond futures will breach
resistance defined by their 2005 peak and rise to test their 2003 peak
during H1-2008. However, we expect that modest strength during the
first half on the back of economic weakness will be followed by a very
negative second half as the market begins to discount the effects on
currency purchasing power of a massive increase in government
borrowing/spending.
Gold and Gold Stocks
Gold
We are presently short-term bullish on both gold and the US$, but this
does not mean that we expect gold and the Dollar Index to rally
together over the next few months. Rather, it means that we think the
upside potential outweighs the downside risk in both markets. In the
case of the Dollar Index we think that a bottoming process is underway
and that while this process continues the downside risk will be limited
to a test of the November low (74-75). In gold's case, the potential
will exist for significant additional gains until the dollar's
bottoming process is almost complete, following which a sizeable
gold-market correction is likely to begin.
If the dollar's current bottoming process follows the typical
historical pattern then it will take 3-4 months to complete, after
which a strong multi-month rebound should begin. This suggests to us
that an intermediate-term US$ rally will start before the end of March and
that gold will reach an intermediate-term peak during the first two
months of the year (since turning points in the gold market usually
lead turning points in the currency market).
We expect that yield and credit spreads will continue to widen during
2008; that real interest rates will remain low; and that financial
market volatility will increase. If so then the backdrop will remain
'gold bullish' and a US$-inspired 2-4 month downturn in the gold market
during the first half of the year will be followed by another powerful
advance. Our guess is that gold will end 2008 above $1000, but will
trade below $750 at some point during the first half of the year.
Gold's upward trend relative to the base metals should continue during
2008. Also, we expect that gold will move sharply higher relative to
oil.
Gold Stocks
With one exception (Gold Fields Ltd), we perceive considerably more
downside risk in the major gold stocks than in gold bullion and only
slightly more upside potential. As a result, we don't see a good reason
to take long-term investment positions in the majors. This
has, in fact, been our view for at least four years. These
stocks periodically become oversold relative to gold bullion and at
such times they make good trading vehicles, but on a longer-term basis
they are not worth the hassle. There are simply too many things that
can go wrong with them compared to the amount of additional upside
potential they offer. In our opinion, if you are risk-tolerant and
looking for ways to leverage gains in the price of gold bullion then
you should own a portfolio comprising mid-tier and junior gold mining
equities, but if you are risk averse you should focus on gold bullion
or gold bullion surrogates such as GLD.
The gold-stock indices can be expected to track gold bullion during
2008, falling further during gold-market corrections and rebounding
faster thereafter. However, if the broad stock market were to become
very weak then we could encounter a period during which the gold sector
falls while gold bullion rises.
We expect to see an increase in takeover activity in the gold sector
during 2008, with mid-tier miners seeking to acquire juniors and majors
seeking to acquire mid-tiers.
Possible surprises:
1) Barrick Gold makes a takeover bid for Kinross Gold
2) A large diversified miner (BHP, Rio Tinto, Xstrata, etc.) decides to
increase its exposure to gold by making a takeover bid for a large gold
mining company
The US Stock Market
There's a lot of discussion in the press about whether the US economy
will go into recession during 2008, but we think such discussions are
irrelevant because the US economy is ALREADY in recession. The US
government reported strong GDP growth for the third quarter of last
year and might report some additional growth for the fourth quarter,
but these government-produced numbers seldom reflect reality.
Properly accounting for the effects of inflation would, we strongly
believe, reveal that the US economy has been contracting in real terms
for many months. This makes intuitive sense given a) the depression in
the residential housing sector and the effect that the
housing/construction-related downturn must be having on consumer
spending, and b) the deleterious effects on non-energy-related spending
of the sharp rise, over the past 12 months, in the price of energy.
Recession-like economic conditions combined with the currency's loss of
purchasing power have caused corporate profit margins to contract and
the S&P500's rate of earnings growth to fall over the past six
months, and more of the same is likely over the coming 2-3 quarters. In
fact, there's a good chance that S&P500 earnings will be lower in
2008 than they were in 2007. But as far as the stock market is
concerned the relevant question is: how much of this downturn in
corporate profitability is factored into current stock prices?
Even though the overall market's relatively high P/E ratio suggests
that the aforementioned downturn in corporate profitability has not yet
been fully discounted, the above question is difficult to answer due to
the huge disparities between different sectors. For example, the
housing depression will most likely extend through 2008 and cause the
homebuilding business to become even worse than it is today, but the
homebuilding sector has already lost 75% of its collective market
capitalisation (as measured by the Dow Jones US Home Construction Index
-- DJUSHB). One or two major homebuilders will probably go bankrupt
before the depression runs its course, but the entire industry is not
going to disappear. Considering that the homebuilding sector's decline
is already in the same league as the NASDAQ's 2000-2002 bust it is
reasonable to assume that the stock market has come close to
discounting the worst in this case. It's a similar story in the
financial sector in that almost every company involved in the
originating, intermediating, packaging and/or insuring of
mortgage-related debt has already been taken out back and shot. The
stock prices of some high-profile financial companies could go to zero
during 2008, but the entire industry is not going to disappear.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that at some point this year
the better-managed financial companies (and their stocks) will begin to
rebound strongly.
In general, it seems to us that the sectors that have suffered due to a
substantial deterioration in business fundamentals -- whether it be the
homebuilding sector due to the obvious problems in the housing market
or the financial sector due to the rampant mispricing of credit risk or
the airline sector due to the dramatic increase in the price of oil --
have already been pummeled to levels where the negatives are close to
being fully discounted. On the other hand, the sectors in which
business conditions remain firm do not appear to have much downside
risk. For example, although we expect the price of oil to drop back to
the 70s during 2008 we don't think this will lead to substantial
weakness in the major oil stocks because valuations remain low and
because oil-related equities generally didn't react in a meaningful way
to the final $20 increase in the oil price.
Another point worth noting is that long-term interest rates (bond
yields) are currently at levels that should be supportive for equities.
We perceive significant upside risk in bond yields, but while they
remain low the effects on stock prices of the ramping down of earnings
expectations will be mitigated. By the same token, if bond yields
establish a strong upward trend then the stock market's situation will
take a dramatic turn for the worse.
The bottom line is that the conditions are not in place to make 2008 a
good year for the stock market, but, on the other hand, we can't see
where the downside leadership is going to come from to make it a
particularly bad year. Our guess is that the S&P500 will end the
year with a small loss due primarily to the continuation of downward
pressure in the financial sector and weakness in the stocks of
companies that rely on discretionary consumer spending, offset by
stability or modest strength elsewhere.
The biggest risk is that inflation fears propel bond yields sharply
higher. A sharp rise in bond yields would lead to P/E-ratio-compression
in the stock market and limit the Fed's ability to provide monetary
stimulus.
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